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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LARRY SHELMIDINE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents/
CHARLENE POLLY COOK,
Intervenor,
:

Case No.
14152

-vs CHARLES A. JONES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants, Charles A. Jones, et al., appeal
from the granting to respondent of an Extraordinary Writ in the
Nature of Prohibition prohibiting appellants as lay judges
from imposing imprisonment or jail sentences upon a conviction
of the offense over which they otherwise have jurisdiction.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Third Judicial District,
State of Utah# the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge,
granted respondents' petition for extraordinary writ in the
nature of prohibition prohibiting appellants as lay judges
from imposing imprisonment or jail sentences upon a conviction of the offense over which they otherwise have jurisdiction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's
order granting a writ of prohibition and a remand of the
case for further proceedings on the charges filed against
respondents.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents were charged with the crime of driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44 (1953), as amended.

Respondent Larry J. Shelmidine's

case was set for trial before appellant Charles A. Jones on
January 16, 1975.

Respondent John R. Reeves' case was set

for trial before Lynn D. Bernard on March 25, 1975.

-2-
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Respondent

Charlene P. Cook's case was set for trial before Charles A.
Jones on April 10, 1975.
The penalty involved if respondents are found
guilty is imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor
more than six months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor
more than $299, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Trials for all respondents were stayed pending
the outcome of this case.

'

Respondents sought a petition for extraordinary
writ of prohibition forbiding appellants from hearing criminal
cases where imposition of imprisonment or jail sentence was
poss ible.
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., granted
respondents an extraordinary writ of prohibition, modified from
respondents' petition, forbiding appellants from imposing
imprisonment or jail sentence upon conviction of the offenses
over which they otherwise have jurisdiction.
It is from this order that appeal and reversal is
sought.

;
-3-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM GUARANTEES
DUE PROCESS.
Respondents contended in the lower court that the
Utah Justice of the Peace system denies defendants due process
in criminal cases heard and tried by a non-attorney judge
where imprisonment is imposed.

The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,

Jr ., Third Judicial District Judge, he Id t hat following a
criminal case, the imposition of a jail sentence or imprisonment by a non-attorney judge denies the defendant the rights
to fair trial and to counsel and is void.

(The Court did not

rule on the respondents' equal protection argument.)
Appellants submit that the Utah Justice of the Peace
system as presently constituted guarantees due process and
that the right to a fair trial and the right to counsel are
preserved within our justice court and "two-tiered" court
systems . • ..'

-4-
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A.

THE UTAH JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM INSURES

THE REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF A FAIR TRIAL.
In Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the
United States Supreme Court stated that a state is free to:
" . . . regulate the procedure
of i ts courts in accordance with its
own conception of policy and fairness
unless in so doing it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental . . .
Its procedure does not run afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment because another
method may seem to our thinking to be
fairer or wiser or to give a surer
promise of protection to the prisoner
at the bar." 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330,
78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) .
The value and necessity of allowing each state a great deal
of leeway in making its own policy determinations by balancing
the individual and social costs in the due process consideration has long been recognized by the United States Supreme
Court.

Though Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1144,

86 L.Ed. 591 (1942), was overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), this part
of the opinion still has application:

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Asserted denial / of due
process of law_J7 is to be tested
by an appraisal of the totality of
facts in a given case. That which
may, in one setting, constitute a
denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of
justice, may, in other circumstances,
and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial. In
the application of such a concept,
there is always the danger of falling
into the habit of formulating the
guarantee into a set of hard and
fast rules, the application of which
in a given case may be to ignore the
qualifying factors therein disclosed."
316 U.S. at 462.

.

Thus, due process has a standard of common sense,
weighing

a standard of fairness and another standard of

facts and circumstances, to determine if a particular proceeding meets with the constitutional requisites and insures the
defendant the reasonable likelihood of a fair trial.
The denial of due process must be the denial of
"fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice."

Kingsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361

U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960).

Therefore, the

crucial factor in determining the judicial qualifications of

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a j u s t i c e of the peace is whether he is capable of being
f a i r and i m p a r t i a l .

I t i s not a question of whether a

j u s t i c e can, in a l l instances, conduct an e r r o r - f r e e t r i a l .
The due process clause has never been interpreted to guarantee

the accused an e r r o r - f r e e t r i a l .

Beck v. Washington, 369

U.S. 5 4 1 , 82 S . C t . 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962), Cf. Colten v .
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 84 (1972).
Appellant contends that a lay judge is capable of
being as fair and impartial as an attorney judge.

The Arizona

Supreme Court, in their recent landmark case upholding the
Arizona Justice Court system held:
"The fact that a Justice of the
Peace is not an attorney does not mean
that he is per se unqualified to declare
"the law in the limited type of situations
over which he has jurisdiction. The
fact that a judicial error may be made in
a proceeding does not necessarily imply a
denial of due process of law. The 14th
Amendment does not assure immunity from
judicial error." Crouch v. Justice of
Peace Court of the 6th Precinct, 7 Ariz.
App. 460, 440 P.2d 1,000 (1968).

-7-
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The case of Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S.
345, 92 S.Ct. 2119f 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972), is in point in
this regard.

The United States Supreme Court held that it

was within the bounds of due process for the City of Tampa
to authorize municipal court clerks who were neither lawyers
or judges to issue warrants, stating that the requirement of
being neutral and detached could be met by a layman under
judicial supervision.

The defendant in Shadwick argued that

a lay clerk was incapable of understanding and applying the
principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment.

To this, the

Court answered:
11

It is less than clear, however, '
as to who would qualify as a 'judicial
officer1 under appellant's theory.
There is some suggestion in appellant's
brief that a judicial officer must be a
lawyer or the municipal court judge
himself. . . But it has never been held
that only a lawyer or judge could grant
a warrant, regardless of the court system
or the type of warrant involved. In
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
270-271 (1960), the Court implied that
United States Commissioners, many of
whom were not lawyers or judges, were
nonetheless 'independent judicial
officers.,,, Id. at 347-48.

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court then stated that the test for the qualifications
of a magistrate was whether he was detached and capable of
determining probable cause, and held that non-lawyer magistrates
were capable of meeting the test.
"Appellant likewise has failed to
demonstrate that these clerks lack
capacity to determine probable cause.
Our legal system has long entrusted
non-lawyers to evaluate more complex
and significant factual data than that
in the case at hand . . . The significance
and responsibility of these lay judgments
betray any belief that the Tampa clerks
could not determine probable cause for
arrest. What we . . . reject today is any
per se invalidation of a state or local
warrant system on the ground that the
issuing magistrate is not a lawyer or a
judge. Communities may have sound reasons
for delegating the responsibility of
issuing warrants to competent personnel
other than judges or lawyers." Id. at
352. (Emphasis added.)
While the Shadwick case decided only that non-lawyer,
non-judicial clerks were constitutionally capable of deciding
probable cause, it is relevant to the present case.

The issue

presently before the Court is whether non-lawyer Justices of
the Peace are per se unqualified to declare the law in a limited

-9-
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type of misdemeanor situations.

The Shadwick court would

reject such a blanket disqualification.
The Court in Shadwick placed great stock in the
fact that the non-lawyer clerks who were deciding probable
cause had limited jurisdiction and were closely supervised
by judicial officers.

Similarly, under the Utah system,

Justices of the Peace benefit from required legal training,
close supervision by higher courts, and limited jurisdiction.
Utah law requires close supervision and training of
all Justices of the Peace, assuring that the system meets with
reasonable fairness and due process.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-27,

passed in 1971, sets up a mandatory system of continuing
education for Justices of the Peace:
"All justices of the peace shall
attend one of two annual institutes to
be supervised by the Utah Supreme Court.
Any justice not attending one institute
during the year shall vacate his office
unless he has obtained a written excuse
for good cause from the chief justice
of the state Supreme Court."
It shou ]d also be noted that the Manual for Justices of the
Peace in the State of Utah, Bodenheimer, University of Utah
Press (1956) /_ Revised in 1974_7 by law must be made available

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J.-10Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to every justice of the peace:
"Each county, city or town shall
provide and keep current for each
justice of the peace within its jurisdiction, a copy of the motor vehicle
laws of Utah, handbook for justices
of the peace as approved by the Utah
Supreme Court, state laws affecting
municipalities and its county, city or
town ordinances." Utah Code Ann. §
78-5-1.2.
From these two statutes, it is apparent that Utah recognizes
the need for and has taken steps to assure the legal quality
of its justices of the peace.

Both the continuing education

requirement and the content of the Justice of the Peace Manual
are under the supervision of the Utah Supreme Court, thus
assuring that the necessary and accurate legal information
will be imparted to all justices of the peace.

The Manual

is very thorough and contains, among other things, a detailed
outline of a criminal trial and sections on evidentiary and
sentencing procedures and problems.
However, probably the most valuable form of "continuing
education" is the Justice's of the Peace continuous exposure to
similar types of litigation.

Over eighty percent of the cases

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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before Justice Courts are traffic violations.

Because of

this, the justice becomes a specialist in handling certain
types of cases, further insuring his awareness of and
capability of handling all legal issues.
Beyond the educational requirements, Utah law also
sets up a supervisory scheme which anticipates a thorough
review of the disposition of cases in justice courts.

Utah

Code Ann. § 78-5-31 provides:
"Every justice of the peace shall
file a monthly report with his respective
county attorney stating the number of
criminal prosecutions in his precinct,
the character of the offenses charged, the
number of convictions, the amount of fines
and penalties imposed, and the amount
. collected. Reports shall be filed the
first Monday of the following month."
The justice courts are also subject to and receive
the benefits provided under the Court Administrator Act, thus
further assuring that the practices and procedures in justice
courts will be uniform with those in all other state courts.
For example, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-21 (1953), provides:

-12-
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"(3) The (judicial) council
shall be responsible for the development of uniform administrative policy
for the courts throughout the state.
The chief judge shall be responsible
for the implementation of the policies
developed by the council and for the
general management of the courts with
the aid of the administrator. The
council shall have the following powers,
duties and responsibilites:
(a) Establish general policies
for the operation of the courts, including
uniform rules and forms for practice and
procedure, consistent with law and the
provisions of this act."
Of course, Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-43 (1953), provides
automatic "Trial de Novo" from a verdict of guilty in a justice
court, further insuring direct supervision by the higher courts.
See Trial de Novo, infra.

These three sections of Utah law

evidence the State's concern for assuring the existence of a
uniform and fair judicial system.

Recognizing the need for

Justice Courts, the State has made the effort to assure that
such Courts comport with due process.

The United States Supreme

Court has recognized that such systems meet the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See, e.g., Shadwick

v. City of Tampa, supra.
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Another element of the Justice of the Peace system
in Utah, which assures compliance with due process standards
under the Shadwick decision, is that Justices of the Peace
have very limited criminal jurisdiction.

Article VIII Section

8 of the Utah Constitution provides:
"The legislature shall determine
the number of justices of the peace to
be elected, and shall fix by law their
powers, duties and compensation. The
jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace
shall be as now provided by law, but
the legislature may restrict the same."
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, Utah Code Ann. §
78-5-4 (1953), narrowly restricts the jurisdiction of justice
courts.
"Justices' courts have jurisdiction
of the following public offenses committed
within the respective counties in which
such courts are established:

• '

(1) Petit Larceny.
(2) Assault or battery not charged
to have been committed upon a public
officer in the discharge of his duties or
to have been committed with such intent
as to render it a felony.
(3) Breaches of the peace, committing
a willful injury to property and all m i s demeanors punishable by a fine less than $300
or by imprisonment in the county jail or
municipal prison not exceeding 6 months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The importance of this limited jurisdiction is stressed in
the Justice's Manual, which devotes a chapter to the subject
of criminal jurisdiction and discusses the entire scope and
limits of justice court jurisdiction.

The Manual admonishes

the Justice Court judge to decide the jurisdiction issue prior
to any other action.
"The first question a justice of the
peace must consider, when someone comes
before him to file a criminal complaint, is
whether he has jurisdiction over the subject
matter . . . This question is of very great
importance to him. If he tries and punishes
an offender in a case in which he has no
jurisdiction, the whole proceedings are null
and void and he may under certain circumstances
also become liable for damages." Manual for
Justices of the Peace in the State of Utah,
page 19.
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court
recognizes the need for non-attorney judicial officers and
sanctions their use where there is an adequate system of
supervision and limited jurisdiction.

Utah law provides for

such a system and thus is within the bounds of due process.
B. THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL DE NOVO FROM A VERDICT OF
GUILTY IN A JUSTICE COURT FURTHER PRESERVES THE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

-15-
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Appellant has contended that the procedures and safeguards set up by the State insure the accused of a fair trial
before a justice of the peace.

However, the State further

guarantees, by statute, that a defendant who is found guilty
by a trial before a justice of the peace has a right to a trial
de novo, without the need to allege error, so long as he applies
within the statutory time.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-43 (1953).

Furthermore/ if the defendant wishes to bypass the justice court
altogether, he may plead guilty and obtain a trial de novo
without prejudice. See Weaver v. Kimball, 5 9 Utah 72, 202 Pac. 9
(1921), where the Utah Supreme Court held that even though the
defendant had pleaded guilty to a criminal charge in city court,
his right to trial de novo in the district court was still
preserved under (what is now) Utah Code Ann. § 77-57-38 (1953).
This two-tier system for adjudicating less serious
criminal cases was held by the United States Supreme Court in
Colten v. Kentucky, supra, meet the demands of due process.
Colten dealt with the alleged unconstitutionality of levying
a larger fine on trial de novo than was originally assessed in

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the justice court (on the basis of North Carolina v. Pearcef
395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)), Colten
had been convicted of a misdemeanor and fined $10.

Upon being

granted trial de novo (an absolute right in Kentucky, as in
Utah), he was again convicted and then fined $50.
Defendant suggested that the two-tier system forced .
him to "endure a trial in an inferior court with less than
adequate protections in order to secure a trial comporting
completely with constitutional guarantees."

The court acknowledged

that many states do not provide full constitutional safeguards,
but held that where a trial de novo was available as a matter of
right, the two-tier system was not violative of due process:
11

. . . /~~T_J7he inferior courts
are not designed or equipped to conduct
error-free trials, .or to insure full
recognition of constitutional freedoms.
They are courts of convenience, to
provide speedy and inexpensive means
of disposition of charges of minor
offenses, Colten v. Commonwealth,
467 S.W.2d at 379.
(M)any . . . systems . . . lack
some of the safeguards provided in more
serious criminal cases . . . Some,
including Kentucky, do not record proceedings and the judges may not be
trained for their positions either by
experience or schooling.
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We are not persuaded, however
that the Kentucky arrangement for
dealing with the less serious offenses
disadvantages defendants any more or
any less than trials conducted in a
court of general jurisdiction in the
first instance, as long as the latter
are always available." 407 U.S. at
113,118.
The court in Colten recognized the problem with nonattorney judges, yet approved of a system which utilized them.
Appellant contends that this answers an issue presently before
this Court; utilization of non-attorney judges to hear lower
misdemeanor offenses does not violate due process where the
right to a trial de novo exists.
The Colten decision properly recognized that justice
courts, besides offering a speedy trial, quick deliberation of
the issues, convenience, and monetary savings to both defendant
and state, offer certain strategical advantages to the defendant:
"Proceedings in the inferior courts
are simple and speedy . . . Such proceedings
offer a defendant the opportunity to learn
about the prosecution's case and, if he
chooses, he need not reveal his own. He
may also plead guilty without a trial and
promptly secure a de novo trial in a court
of general criminal jurisdiction. He
cannot, and will not, face the realistic
threat of a prison sentence in the inferior
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court without having the help of counsel,
whose advice will also be available in
determining whether to seek a new trial,
with the slate wiped clean, or to accept
the penalty imposed by the inferior court.
The State has no such options. Should it
not prevail in the lower court, the case
is terminated, whereas the defendant has
the choice of beginning anew. In reality
his choices are to accept the decision
of the judge and the sentence imposed in
the inferior court or to reject what in
effect is no more than an offer in settlement of his case and seek the judgment of
judge or jury in the superior court, with
sentence to be determined by the full
record made in that court . . . We cannot
say that the Kentucky trial de novo system,
as such, is unconstitutional or that it
presents hazards warranting the restraints
called for in North Carolina v. Pearce,
particularly since such restraints might,
to the detriment of both defendant and
State, diminish the likelihood that inferior
courts would impose lenient sentences
whose effect would be to limit the discretion of a superior court judge or jury if
the defendant is retried and found guilty."
407 U.S. at 119. (Emphasis added.)
Appellant submits that such remarks apply to the Utah Justice
Court system as well as the Kentucky system, since both are
virtually identical.
The Court's characterization of an inferior court's
judgments as "an offer in settlement" is particularly discerning
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since the bulk of the cases handled in such courts are traffic
violations.

Uhlman, Justifying Justice Courts, 52 Judicature

22 (1966).
*

In light of due process standards, it is reasonable
for a state to relegate the bulk of its minor criminal cases
through an inferior court system where procedures are more
relaxed as long as access to a more sophisticated court is
guaranteed.
Appellant contends that all the cases involving the
issue of non-attorney judges presiding over misdemeanor cases,
where a right to a trial de novo existed, have held that due
process was not violated.

In Crouch v. Justice of Peace Court of

Sixth Precinct, supra, the defendant was charged with driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, as are respondents
in the present case.

Upon his conviction the defendant appealed,

claiming that the non-attorney justice's giving of jury instructions as to the law was violative of due process.

The Arizona

Appellate Court held that the giving of such instructions by a
non-attorney judge does not deny a criminal misdemeanant due

-20-
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process of law.

This case has been cited by Arizona Appellate

courts in upholding the validity of preliminary hearings,
involving a felony, presided over by a non-attorney justices
of the peace.

State v. Lynch, 197 Ariz. 463, 489 P.2d 698 (1971);

State v. Dziqqel, 16 Ariz.App. 289, 492 P.2d 1227 (1972).
The Illinois Supreme Court in City of Decatur v.
Kushner, 43 111.2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969), and the Federal
District Court of Mississippi in Mellikan v. Avent, 300 F.Supp.
516 (D.C. Miss. 1969), upheld the use of non-attorney judges.
Both courts casually dismissed the issue, it seems, without
doubt as t o t h e f i r m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

b a s i s for

non-attorney

"The c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e j u s t i c e
of t h e p e a c e c o u r t i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
b e c a u s e a j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e may be a
p e r s o n who i s n o t t r a i n e d i n t h e law i s
u n i q u e and of no m e r i t . "
Mellikan v.
A v e n t , 300 F . S u p p . 516 a t 519 ( D . C . N . D .
Miss., 1969).
j

Respondent,

in e a r l i e r

.

\

memoranda, d i s m i s s e d t h e

of t h e above c a s e s b e c a u s e t h e y were p r e - A r g e r s i n g e r
407 U . S . 2 5 , 92 S . C t .

justices.

1 9 8 3 , 32 L . E d . 2 d 530 ( 1 9 7 2 ) .

v.

value

Hamlin,

Appellant

c o n t e n d s t h a t r e s p o n d e n t p u t s t o o much f a i t h i n A r g e r s i n g e r
and a t t e m p t s t o e x t e n d i t s h o l d i n g t o o f a r .
Argersinger

case questioning

In t h e only

a non-attorney's

- 2J.1Reuben
- Clark Law School, BYU.
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post-

constitutional

authority to try criminal prosecutions (and subsequently
imprison if needed) in a system guaranteeing trial de novo,
the Kentucky Appellate Court forcefully upheld the entire
lay-man judge, two-tier inferior court system using the
same rationale as all the above cases:

"The fact that the

accused needs a lawyer to defend him does not mean that he
needs to be tried before a lawyer judge."

Ditty v. Hampton

K£.;'490 S.W.2d 772 (1972), appeal dismissed 414 U.S. 885 (1973).
The Court recognized that in cases supporting
Argersinger's right to counsel, such as In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1966), or White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1962),
the Supreme Court never questioned whether the involved proceedings were conducted by non-attorney magistrates and judges.
Therefore, the Kentucky Court dismissed the Argersinger
argument, concluding that "there never has been any thought that
a right to be tried by a lawyer judge grows out of the right to
be defended by a lawyer."

490 S.W.2d at 774.

Respondent has attempted to apply the Argersinger
argument to this state by citing Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba,

-22-
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115 Cal.Rptr. .632, 12 Cal.3d 323, 525 P.2d 72 (1974).
this is only building error on error.

However,

As Ditty v. Hampton,

supra, has shown, the Argersinger argument cannot successfully
be applied to two-tier court systems such as Kentucky and Utah.
To show its affect upon the California Justice Court system,
which is not two-tiered and therefore is radically different
in affecting defendant's due process rights, only tends to
confuse the issues.
The California Justice Court system is inherently
infested with due process infirmities not present in Utah's
two-tier system.

Under California law, .the accused does not

have a right to trial de novo, but must appeal his case,
Cal. Penal Code § 1466 (West 1970).

This involves the

innumerable problems of burden of proof, grounds for appeal,
time and expense.

To complicate matters, the accused does not

have an automatic right to appeal, but has such only at the
discretion of the higher court, Cal. Penal Code § 1469 (West,
1970).

Thus, in California, the accused before the justice

court is not automatically guaranteed a right to be tried before

-23-
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an attorney-judge, but has such only if he can allege error
prejudicial enough to persuade the higher court.
To further add to the gross inadequacies of
California's appellate scheme/ the justice courts are not
courts of record (Cal. Const., Art VI, § 1 ) . Thus, often
times the appeal is based solely "upon a statement of the
case settled or prepared by the non-attorney judge himself."
115 Cal.Rptr. at 638.

Also, Colten v. Kentucky, supra, spoke

extensively about the dangers of vindictiveness inherent in
the "appeal" system, see North Carolina v. Pearce, supra.
The Utah Justice Court system is far more protective
of the individual's rights.

The accused may have the speedy

trial with quick deliberation of all issues at little expense
of time or money.

He may plead guilty while still retaining

his right to appeal or he may plead not guilty and force the
prosecution to reveal its case against him.

Following the

verdict of the court—no matter what the determination—the
accused is automatically entitled to a trial de novo.

This

guarantees an opportunity to be heard before an attorney-judge,
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without

any p r e j u d i c e

rulings

or v e r d i c t .

justice

court

to do.

In addition,

to exist

or influence

The de novo c o u r t

record,

thus
the

insuring

the j u s t i c e
gives

that

court's

no h e e d t o

which Gordon

the

attempts

" p o s s i b i l i t y of vindictiveness

i n P e a r c e /_ t h e

appeal

K e n t u c k y /_ o r U t a h _ Z t w o - t i e r
at

from

system_J7 i s

systems."

not

Ditty

found

inherent

in

v . Hampton,

the
supra

775.
Thus,

infirm

in protecting

be l o g i c a l l y
safeguards
right

effect

on t h e C a l i f o r n i a

the

individual's

extended to

not only

C.

as

system,

due p r o c e s s

the Utah t w o - t i e r

the accused's

to a speedy t r i a l

appeal

right

inherently

rights,

system which

to a fair

cannot
effectively

trial,

but

his

well.

THE JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM IN UTAH PRESENTLY OPERATES

TO GUARANTEE RATHER THAN VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
The U n i t e d S t a t e s
"(v)indication
clause does

is

justice.

.

688,

.

of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l

not

Each s t a t e

86 L . E d .

Supreme C o u r t

demand u n i f o r m i t y

free
."
932

to

devise

its

rights
of

under

that

the

t h e due

process

p r o c e d u r e by t h e

states.

own way o f

Hysler v. Florida,
(1942).

has s t a t e d

securing

essential

315 U . S . 4 1 1 , 4 1 6 ,

As p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d ,
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the

62

S.Ct.

Supreme

Court has held that a two-tier judicial system consisting of
justice courts and a right to trial de novo meets with due
process, and that the requirements that a magistrate be neutral
and detached does not require him to be a lawyer.
and Shadwick, supra.

See Colten

Thus, the due process question concerning

non-attorney justices is properly left to each state.

When

applying the broad restraints of due process, a court should
inquire into the nature of the demands on individual freedoms in
relation to the social needs which justify these demands.

Frank

v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.Ed.2d 877
(1959) .
As was stated earlier, the "asserted denial (of due
process of law) is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality
of facts in a given case.

That which may, in one setting,

constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and
in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial."
Betts v. Brady, supra, 316 U.S. at 462.
While the complaint in this case is limited to Salt
Lake County, a decision for the plaintiffs would have serious
ramifications on the justice of the peace systems throughout
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the entire state.

(Here again, note that since the population

distribution in Utah differs greatly from that in California,
the due process considerations must be examined differently
in the present case than in Gordon v. Yuba City, supra.)
Because of its rural characteristics, it may be highly unfeasible,
if not impossible, to have an attorney justice of the peace in.
many of the rural counties of Utah.

A study of the Utah

court system has revealed:
11

(M) any counties do not have
sufficient legal business or law
trained personnel to justify city
courts even at the county seats.
Motorists, particularly tourists,
either state residents or non-residents,
could be subjected to considerable
inconvenience if ready access to a method
of adjudicating traffic violations were
not available. An equally substantial
burden would be imposed upon law enforcement personnel if judicial officials
were not readily available, particularly
in view of the broadened constitutional
protections being developed by the United
States Supreme Court." Anderson &
Lockhart, Utah Courts Today, Report to
the Legislative Council, 34 (1966).
The ANNUAL ROSTER OF ACTIVE RESIDENT UTAH ATTORNEYS of 1975
reveals that there are no attorneys at all in Daggett, Morgan,
Piute, Rich, Wayne and Kane Counties.

Only one attorney

resides in Garfield County and the counties of Beaver, Emery
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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and Summit have only two attorneys.

Several other counties

have only three or four attorneys residing within sparsely
populated large geographical areas.

These statistics demon-

strate that to require all justicesof the peace to be attorneys
would toll the "death knell" to the justice of the peace
system in much of Utah.

Presently, at least in the rural

districts of the state, the proposed requirement that justices
of the peace be attorneys would not lead to fairer administration
of justice, but exactly the opposite.

Such problems could deny

the accused his right to speedy trial, add considerable, expense
and time to his right to trial, discourage him from participating
in costly litigation, add to the increasing disrespect for law
and courts, and handicap effective law enforcement and adjudication.

Thus, a more thorough due process analysis, taking into

account the specific circumstances of this case and weighing the
relevant policy factors would seemingly compel the retention
of the non-attorney justice of the peace.

Appellant contends

that the decision of whether to abolish the justice of the peace
system or the use of non-attorney justices in that system is
best left tothe state legislature.
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The Supreme Court in Shadwick, supra, recognized
that states had a valid interest in using competent lay
personnel in their court systems:
"Many municipal courts face stiff
and unrelenting caseloads. A judge
pressured with the docket before him may
give warrant applications more brisk and
summary treatment than would a clerk.
All this is not to imply that a judge or
lawyer would not normally provide the most
desirable review of warrant requests. But
our federal system warns of converting
desirable practice into constitutional
commandment. It recognizes in plural and
diverse state activities one key to
national innovation and vitality." 407
U.S. at 353-54. (Emphasis added.)
The Justice of the Peace system in Utah, by relieving
an otherwise overwhelming caseload on city courts, is a guarantor
rather than a violator of due process.

Not only is it impossible

to prove that a non-lawyer judge is per se less capable of
handling a misdemeanor trial, it is very likely that doing away
with such justices—with its concommitant effect on the entire
system—would be a denial of due process and, perhaps, a denial
of the right to a speedy trial.
POINT II
THE UTAH JUSTICE COURT SYSTEM DOES NOT DENY THE
ACCUSED THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The right to counsel in certain criminal prosecutions is guaranteed by the "Sixth Amendment which in enumerated
situations has been made applicable to the states by reason
of the Fourteenth Amendment" and which "provided specified
standards for 'all criminal prosecutions.'"
Hamlin, supra.

Argersinger v.

The assistance of counsel when there is a

potential for imprisonment, is required to comply with such a
standard; so that a defendant may be adequately assured of his
"right to be heard."

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct.

55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932).

It is, therefore, the function of

counsel to assure this right of adequate representation.
The function of the court, however, is radically
different.

The Kentucky Court succinctly stated the obvious:
"Due process, as regards the tribunal
hearing a case, usually has been considered
to require only that the tribunal be fair
and impartial. In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed.2d 942 (1955).
The function of the court is not to
defend the accused, or to represent him,
but to decide fairly and impartially. An
accused needs counsel to defend him, as
pointed out in Gideon v. Wainwright,
because the government employs lawyers to
prosecute him—because our system of criminal
justice is an adversary system. But the
judge is not one of the accused's adversaries,
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and is not there either to defend or to
prosecute him. So the fact that the
accused needs a lawyer to defend him
does not mean that he needs to be tried
before a lawyer judge." 490 S.W.2d at
774-775.
The United States Supreme Court has never acknowledged,
either explicitly or implicitly, that an accused in a criminal
prosecution had the right to an attorney-judge.

In Ditty, the

Court reviewed the cases making up the backbone of Arqersinqer;
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); White v. Maryland, supra;
and In Re Gault, supra.

The Kentucky Court concluded:

"Never on the occasion of any of
those decisions, was it even suggested
that the right to counsel carries with
it the right to be tried by a lawyer
judge. Obviously, the Supreme Court was
aware, when it decided White v. Maryland,
that examining trials frequently are
conducted by nonlawyer magistrates, and
was aware, when it decided Gault, that
juvenile court judges in many areas are
not lawyers. Yet no question was
recognized as existing with respect to
the composition of the examining courts
and juvenile courts.
"All this is to show that there
never has been any thought that a right
to be tried by a lawyer judge grows out
of the right to be defended by a lawyer."
490 S.W.2d at 774.
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The Court added:
"We believe there are strong
considerations that would support a
holding that even if due process
required lawyer judges for courts of
general criminal jurisdiction, the
requirement would not apply to the
inferior courts in the Kentucky twotier system." Ibid at 776.
It is interesting to note, in light of respondent's
contentions that Argersinger demands an attorney-judge in
criminal prosecutions resulting in imprisonment, that Colten v.
Kentucky was decided the same day as Argersinger.

Colten was also

argued after Argersinger, allowing the court to make their decision supporting the Kentucky non-attorney judge, two-tier system
after hearing all arguments supporting Argersinger'.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has never implied
that the functions or the qualifications of the judge be
the same to those of an attorney.
true.

Indeed, the opposite is

The judge need only be fair and impartial.

A formal

legal training is not a prerequisite to fairness and
impartiality.
The non-attorney justice, because of his limited
jurisdiction and similar cases, quickly becomes familiar
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with and competent to handle recurring issues.

In the court-

room, a fair and impartial resolution of complex questions
can be made when counsel clarifies the issue while advocating
his client's position.

Whether or not error results, the

accused has an automatic right to trial de novo to clarify
or rectify any dispute.
CONCLUSION
Each state is allowed to regulate its own court
procedure in the manner serving its interest best.

The Utah

Legislature has established a two-tiered system, with trial
de novo, providing the accused with protections and rights
that other states1 systems lack.

The Legislature further

insures the accused a fair trial in a justice of the peace
court by requiring continuing legal education, close supervision by higher courts, and limited jurisdiction.
All cases involving the issue of non-attorney judges
presiding over misdemeanor cases, where a right to trial de
novo existed, have held that due process was not violated.
Gordon v. Justice Court, supra, is not applicable to the present
case due to the radical differences between California's and
Utah's Justice Court system.
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The right to effective representation by an
attorney in criminal cases has never been held, nor
inferred, by the United States Supreme Court to establish
a right to an attorney-judge in misdemeanor cases resulting
in imprisonment or jail sentence.
For these reasons and for the reasons stated within
these arguments, appellants contend that the decision of the
lower court should be reversed and remanded for disposition
not inconsistent with this Court's opinion.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE
Rawlings, Rogers & Black
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants

-34-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW, LIBRARY
DEC 1 7 1975
IRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J. Reuben Clark Law School

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

